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Abstract 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Deep learning has become the predominant machine learning 
method and showed outstanding performance in diverse 
tasks, e.g. self-driving cars [17], surveillance [18], malware 
detection [19], drones and robotics [20], [21], and voice 
command recognition [22]. Though deep learning has 
received much success, recent studies has revealed the 
vulnerability of deep learning. 
Convolutional neural networks (CNN) are one category of 
the outstanding algorithms of deep learning and has 
performed state-of-the-art accuracy in image classification 
tasks. However, CNN models have been recently found 
vulnerable to well-designed input samples [1]-[8], [15]. 
These samples can easily fool a well-performed CNN model 
with little perturbations imperceptible to humans, which 
called adversarial perturbations. (e.g. Fig. 1). Szegedy et al. 
[1] first discovered the intriguing weakness of CNN models 
and introduced adversarial perturbations against them. The 
profound implications of their research have triggered a wide 
interest of researchers in adversarial attacks and defenses for 
CNN models, more methods to generate adversarial 
perturbations have been proposed [2]-[8], [15]. 
Though most adversarial perturbations are image specific 
(e.g. [1]-[7]), an image-agnostic adversarial perturbation 
called universal adversarial perturbation has been proposed 
by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [8], which is very small 
perturbation vector that causes a set of natural images to be 
misclassified with high probability. The algorithm proceeds 
iteratively over a set of training images and gradually 
aggregates perturbation vectors for each image to builds the 
universal perturbation. At each iteration, the minimal 
perturbation vector that sends the current perturbed image to 
the decision boundary of the classifier is computed and 
aggregated to the current instance of the universal 
Convolutional neural networks (CNN) have become one of the most popu-
lar machine learning tools and are being applied in various tasks, however, CNN 
models are vulnerable to universal perturbations, which are usually human-im-
perceptible but can cause natural images to be misclassified with high probabil-
ity. One of the state-of-the-art algorithms to generate universal perturbations is 
known as UAP. UAP only aggregates the minimal perturbations in every itera-
tion, which will lead to generated universal perturbation whose magnitude can-
not rise up efficiently and cause a slow generation. In this paper, we proposed an 
optimized algorithm to improve the performance of crafting universal perturba-
tions based on orientation of perturbation vectors. At each iteration, instead of 
choosing minimal perturbation vector with respect to each image, we aggregate 
the current instance of universal perturbation with the perturbation which has 
similar orientation to the former so that the magnitude of the aggregation will 
rise up as large as possible at every iteration. The experiment results show that 
we get universal perturbations in a shorter time and with a smaller number of 
training images. Furthermore, we observe in experiments that universal pertur-
bations generated by our proposed algorithm have an average increment of fool-
ing rate by 9% in white-box attacks and black-box attacks comparing with uni-
versal perturbations generated by UAP. 
   
perturbation. However, the minimal perturbations are not the 
best choice to craft universal perturbations, because 
orientation of current minimal perturbation vector and that of 
the current instance of the universal perturbation vector has 
impact on the magnitude of their new aggregation result. For 
example, if they have similar orientation, the magnitude of 
their aggregation will be larger, and the magnitude of their 
aggregation will be smallest if they have opposite orientation. 
As a result, the magnitude of constructed universal 
perturbations may not rise up efficiently in every iteration, it 
will slow down the process of generation. Motivated by this 
analysis, in this paper, we propose an optimized algorithm to 
craft universal perturbations faster. At each iteration, instead 
of choosing minimal perturbation vector, we aggregate the 
current instance of the universal perturbation with the 
perturbation which has similar orientation to the former so 
that the magnitude of the aggregation will rise up as large as 
possible at every iteration. As a result, we can get a universal 
perturbation whose magnitude rise up as soon as possible. 
Besides, we empirically observe that universal perturbations 
generated by our proposed algorithm have better fooling 
performance in both white-box attacks and black-box attacks 
with an average increment of fooling rate by 9%. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we review 
the related work in section II. In section III, we demonstrate 
orientation of perturbation vector has impact on the 
generated universal perturbation and illustrate our 
inspiration, then, we propose our approach to speed up 
universal perturbation generation. In section IV, we present 
our experiment and show results in detail. Finally, we 
conclude our work and draw the future research direction in 
section V. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Despite the impressive performance of CNN models on image 
classification tasks, these models were shown to be highly 
vulnerable to adversarial perturbations. These perturbations 
are divided into two categories: one is image-specific 
perturbations, which are sought to fool a specific image on a 
CNN model. The other is universal perturbations, which are 
image-agnostic and can fool a CNN model on a set of images. 
Szegedy et al. [1] proposed the first algorithm to generate 
image-specific perturbations, called L-BFGS, which generates 
perturbation by performing a single step computation. 
However, L-BFGS used an expensive linear search method to 
find the optimal value, it cost too much time to get a 
perturbation. Goodfellow et al. [2] proposed a fast method to 
generate perturbations, called Fast Gradient Sign Method 
(FGSM), which only performs once optimization along the 
sign of gradient of each pixel. Soon after, there were some 
improvements of FGSM, Rozsa el al. [9] proposed Fast 
Gradient Value method, Tramer et al. [10] proposed RAND-
FGSM and Dong et al. [11] applied momentum to FGSM to 
generate perturbations iteratively, for iterative algorithm are 
harder to defend comparing with one step computation 
algorithm [12]. And there are other outstanding methods to 
generate image-specific perturbations [13], [14], [3]-[7]. 
Particularly, Liu et al. [7] proposed perturbations that can 
perform black-box attacks, which generated with a limited 
knowledge of the model, such as its architecture rather than 
the model parameters. 
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [8] first designed an iterative 
algorithm to generate universal perturbations which cause 
target CNN model return incorrect predictions with high 
probability on a set of images while still remains quasi-
imperceptible to the human eye. The algorithm is known as 
UAP which is based on DeepFool [3]. DeepFool generates 
minimal perturbations that gradually pushing every image to 
the decision boundary for their classes, and all the 
perturbations generated for each image are accumulated to a 
universal perturbation. Mopuri et al. [15] proposed data-free 
UAP, which does not craft universal perturbations with natural 
images directly. Instead, they first generate class impressions 
which are generic representations of the images belonging to 
every category, and then present a neural network based 
generative model to craft universal perturbations with class 
impressions using data-driven objectives. Compared with 
UAP, our proposed Fast-UAP speeds up universal 
perturbation generation based on orientations of perturbation 
vectors, which aggregates additive perturbations with similar 
FIGURE 1.  An example of adversarial perturbation. Left: an original natural image classified as espresso 
with the highest confidence by GoogLeNet model. Center: an adversarial perturbation. Right: an adversarial 
sample craft by adding the center adversarial perturbation to the left natural image and it classified as pillow 
with the highest confidence by GoogLeNet model. 
   
orientation to current instance of aggregations in every 
iteration. Besides, it is observed in experiment that the 
universal perturbations generated by Fast-UAP achieve higher 
average fooling rates in both white-box attacks and black-box 
attacks. 
III. THE FAST-UAP ALGORITHM 
A. OVERVIEW 
UAP adopts an iterative method to generate universal pertur-
bations to fool CNN models on image classification tasks. 
Let 𝑋 = {𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, …, 𝑥𝑛} be a set of natural images, UAP 
seeks a universal perturbation 𝑣 that can fool most images in 
𝑋 on target classifier 𝐶(∙). For each image 𝑥𝑖, if current con-
structed universal perturbation ?̅? does not fool 𝐶(∙) on 𝑥𝑖, a 
minimal perturbation ∆𝑣𝑖 is computed and aggregated to ?̅?, 
here ∆𝑣𝑖 is the perturbation with the smallest magnitude to 
push image 𝑥𝑖 out of decision boundary of its estimated class. 
Which can be expressed as: 
?̅? ← ?̅? + ∆𝑣𝑖. 
UAP computes ∆𝑣𝑖 with respect to 𝑥𝑖 based on DeepFool [3] 
by solving the following optimization problem: 
∆𝑣𝑖← arg min
          𝑣𝑖
||𝑣𝑖||2  s. t.  𝐶(𝑥𝑖 + ?̅? + 𝑣𝑖) ≠ 𝐶(𝑥𝑖). 
Where 𝐶(𝑥𝑖)  denotes the output of target classifier 𝐶(∙) 
when performing 𝑥𝑖 as an input.  
Fast-UAP takes similar process to generate universal per-
turbations. Instead of aggregating minimal perturbation in 
every iteration, Fast-UAP aggregates additive perturbations 
with a similar orientation to current instance of universal per-
turbations. 
B. FAST-UAP 
1) INSPIRATION 
Given two vectors 𝒂  and 𝒃 , the magnitude of 𝒂  add 𝒃  is 
computed as follows: 
 ‖𝒂 + 𝒃‖2 = √‖𝒂‖2
2 + ‖𝒃‖2
2 + 2‖𝒂‖2‖𝒃‖2𝑐𝑜𝑠 < 𝒂, 𝒃 >.
 (1) 
Where 𝑐𝑜𝑠 < 𝒂, 𝒃 > denotes cosine of angle between 𝒂 and 
𝒃. Thus, to get a larger magnitude of sum of 𝒂 and 𝒃, the 
angle between 𝒂 and 𝒃 should be as small as possible, which 
means both 𝒂 and 𝒃 have more similar orientation. 
Inspired by this, we now demonstrate the slow universal 
perturbation generation in UAP. As described above, UAP 
proceeds by aggregating additive perturbations with the 
smallest magnitude to push successive images out of deci-
sion boundaries of their target classifier’s estimated classes. 
However, it ignores the influence of perturbation vectors’ 
orientations. Though these minimal perturbations can push 
corresponding images out of decision boundaries, the mag-
nitude of their aggregation does not rise up efficiently in suc-
cessive iterations, as depicted in Fig. 2a. There is a set of 
images 𝑋 = {𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3} with corresponding class label {ℛ1, 
 ℛ2,  ℛ3} to generate a universal perturbation. When UAP 
proceeds over images 𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , 𝑥3  in sequence, the minimal 
perturbation ∆𝑣𝑖  which sends the corresponding perturbed 
image 𝑥𝑖 + ∆𝑣𝑖  to the decision boundary is computed, and 
aggregated to the current instance of universal perturbation. 
However, the orientations of the minimal perturbations have 
impact on the aggregations’ magnitude growth as shown in 
(1). When the minimal perturbations are added, magnitude 
of current universal perturbation may be smaller than that in 
past iteration because the minimal perturbations have arbi-
trary orientations which likely lead to a drop in universal per-
turbation’s magnitude. For example, in Fig. 2a, when adding 
∆𝑣2, the current perturbation ?̅? has a smaller magnitude than 
∆𝑣1 in past iteration. Because of the drop, the magnitude of 
generated universal perturbation 𝑣  does not rise up to the 
level that is large enough to push the three images out of their 
decision boundaries. This will lead to a slow universal per-
turbation generation. 
To ensure the magnitudes of generated universal perturba-
tions rise up efficiently in every iteration, when proceeding 
over 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 in sequence to generate a universal perturba-
tion, extra perturbation ∆𝑣𝑖 is also computed to send the cor-
responding perturbed image 𝑥𝑖 + ∆𝑣𝑖 to the decision bound-
ary of target classifier, here we choose extra perturbation ∆𝑣𝑖 
which have similar orientation to current constructed univer-
sal perturbation rather than the minimal one, as depicted in 
Fig. 2b. The orientations of current universal perturbations 
in every iteration are reference orientations for choosing ex-
tra perturbations, and it is initialized with the first generated 
extra perturbation ∆𝑣1 with respect to 𝑥1. If the extra pertur-
bation has a more similar orientation to current universal per-
turbation, the magnitude of their aggregation will increase. 
For example, in Fig. 2b, the extra perturbation ∆𝑣2 has a sim-
ilar orientation to current universal perturbation ∆𝑣1  and 
when it is added, the aggregation ?̅? has a large magnitude 
growth compared with ∆𝑣1 in past iteration. As a result, the 
magnitude of generated universal perturbation 𝑣 can be large 
enough to push all three images out of their decision bound-
aries. This will speed up universal perturbation’s magnitude 
growth and lead to a fast universal perturbation generation. 
2) ALGORITHM 
Given image 𝑥 in ℝ𝑑 with distribution 𝜇 and a target classi-
fier 𝐶(∙), we seek a quasi-imperceptible universal perturba-
tion 𝑣 ∈ ℝ𝑑 that satisfy:  
𝐶(𝑥) ≠ 𝐶(𝑥 + 𝑣)  for most 𝑥 in 𝜇. 
Where 𝜇  refers to the distribution of natural images and 
𝐶(𝑥) is the output of target classifier 𝐶(∙) when performing 
𝑥 as an input. Our training set is a set of images 𝑋 = {𝑥1, 𝑥2, 
𝑥3, …, 𝑥𝑛} and target classifier is a CNN model, the algo-
rithm iteratively proceeds over images 𝑥𝑖 and gradually con-
structs the universal perturbation. In more detail, for every 
𝑥𝑖, if the combination of 𝑥𝑖 and current constructed universal 
perturbation ?̅? does not make a label change on the target 
classifier, an extra perturbation ∆𝑣𝑖  with respect to 𝑥𝑖  that 
has a similar orientation to ?̅? is crafted, or this iteration will 
be skipped. The extra perturbation is generated by solving 
the following optimization problem: 
∆𝑣𝑖← arg max
            𝑣𝑖
cos < 𝑣𝑖 , ?̅? >  s. t.  𝐶(𝑥𝑖 + ?̅? + 𝑣𝑖) ≠ 𝐶(𝑥𝑖). 
   
Where ∆𝑣𝑖 is the extra perturbation that has similar orienta-
tion to current universal perturbation ?̅?, and it can push im-
age 𝑥𝑖 out of decision boundary of its estimated class but is 
not always the minimal one. Note that if two vectors have a 
bigger cosine value, they possess a more similar orientation. 
We choose a random image 𝑥0 in 𝑋, and take the orientation 
of minimal perturbation computed with respect to 𝑥0  as 
initialization of universal perturbation. At the end of each it-
eration, to make universal perturbation being quasi-imper-
ceptible to the human eye, we limit the pixel values of uni-
versal perturbation within [−10,10], which is a ℓ∞ norm re-
striction. So, the current constructed universal perturbation 
will be clipped once an extra perturbation is added. At the 
end of every pass on training set 𝑋, the algorithm will check 
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(a) Schematic representation of universal perturbation’s slow magnitude growth in UAP. When adding perturbation ∆𝒗𝟐, current 
universal perturbation 𝒗ഥ has a magnitude drop compared with ∆𝒗𝟏 and the magnitude of generated universal perturbation 𝒗 does 
not get a sufficient growth to push the images 𝒙𝟏, 𝒙𝟐, and 𝒙𝟑 out of their decision boundaries. 
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(b) Schematic representation of Fast-UAP to speed up universal perturbation’s magnitude growth. Perturbation ∆𝒗𝟐 has similar 
orientation to ∆𝒗𝟏 and ∆𝒗𝟑 has similar orientation to 𝒗ഥ. As a result, the magnitudes of 𝒗ഥ  (compared with ∆𝒗𝟏) and 𝒗 (compared 
with 𝒗ഥ) rise up efficiently and the generated universal perturbation 𝒗 can push the images 𝒙𝟏, 𝒙𝟐, and 𝒙𝟑 out of their decision 
boundaries because of its large magnitude. 
FIGURE 2.  Schematic representations of universal perturbation’s slow magnitude growth in UAP and our improvement to over-
come this influence. In these illustrations, points 𝒙𝟏, 𝒙𝟐, and 𝒙𝟑 refer to three images belonging to classification 𝓡𝟏, 𝓡𝟐, and 𝓡𝟑 
respectively and classification regions 𝓡𝒊 are shown in different colors. Algorithm proceeds over 𝒙𝟏, 𝒙𝟐, 𝒙𝟑 in order. In both Fig. 
2a and Fig. 2b: left: illustration of perturbation vectors ∆𝒗𝟏, ∆𝒗𝟐, and ∆𝒗𝟑 to push the images 𝒙𝟏, 𝒙𝟐, and 𝒙𝟑 out of their decision 
boundaries respectively. Center: illustration of addition of the perturbation vectors ∆𝒗𝟏, ∆𝒗𝟐, and ∆𝒗𝟑 (perturbation vectors in Fig. 
2a are scaled up for a better visibility). Right: illustration of attack ability of generated universal perturbation on the images 𝒙𝟏, 
𝒙𝟐, and 𝒙𝟑. 
   
whether the current fooling rate reach the designated value 
𝛿. The fooling rate ℱ is computed as follows: 
ℱ =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑟  s. t.𝑛𝑖=1  𝑟 = {
1,    𝐶(𝑥𝑖 + ?̅?) ≠ 𝐶(𝑥𝑖)
0,    𝐶(𝑥𝑖 + ?̅?) = 𝐶(𝑥𝑖)
. 
Where 𝑛 is the number of testing samples. If ℱ ≥ 𝛿, the al-
gorithm terminates, or a new pass on training set 𝑋 will start 
to improve the quality of the universal perturbation. There 
will be a random shuffling to the set 𝑋 before every pass. The 
Fast-UAP algorithm is presented in detail in Algorithm 1. 
   
FIGURE 3.  Chromatic aberration in perturbed images when adding 𝓵𝟐 norm to restrict universal perturbations generated by Fast-UAP. Left: an 
original image. Center: a perturbed image by adding universal perturbation generated for DenseNet-121 model. Right: a perturbed image by adding 
universal perturbation generated for ResNet-50 model. The chromatic aberrations are easily seen at the edge of the center and the right images. 
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(f) ResNet-101 (g) ResNeXt-101 
FIGURE 4.  Visualization of universal perturbations. The first row are universal perturbations generated by UAP and the second row are universal 
perturbations generated by Fast-UAP, the last row indicates the CNN models which are used to compute the corresponding universal perturbations. 
The pixel values are scaled for visibility. 
     
(a) DenseNet-121: 
cardigan 
(b) GoogLeNet: 
brain coral 
(c) Vgg-16: gar (d) Vgg-19: ox (e) ResNet-50:  
shower curtain 
      
 
 
 
(f) ResNet-101:  
soccer ball 
(g) ResNeXt-101: 
alp 
FIGURE 5.  Example of perturbed images. The first row are original images and the second row are perturbed images which are added universal 
perturbations generated by Fast-UAP, the last row indicates the CNN models which are used to compute the corresponding universal perturbations 
and the labels of perturbed images classified by GoogLeNet model. All original images are chosen from ILSVRC 2012 dataset. 
   
The generated universal perturbations should give a ℓ𝑝 
norm restriction to be quasi-imperceptible. Though ℓ∞ and 
ℓ2 norms are both common magnitude measurements of per-
turbations, we abandon ℓ2  norm because it does not limit 
every pixel values of perturbations and often causes noticea-
ble chromatic aberration in perturbed images, as depicted in 
Fig. 3. A proper ℓ∞ norm value should be chosen to make 
the perturbation imperceptible to human eyes, as well as 
make universal perturbations reaching a high fooling rate. In 
our algorithm, we set the maximum ℓ∞ norm value of uni-
versal perturbations to be 10. 
IV. EXPERIMENTS 
In this section, we describe two experiments to evaluate Fast-
UAP. In the first experiment, we show that Fast-UAP 
generates universal perturbations faster than UAP to meet the 
same designated fooling rates. Then, we evaluate the fooling 
rates of universal perturbations generated by UAP and Fast-
UAP under white-box attacks and black-box attacks 
respectively.  
Algorithm 1: Fast-UAP algorithm to compute universal perturbations. 
1: input: Preprocessed training set 𝑋, target classifier 𝐶(∙) and desig-
nated fooling rate 𝛿. 
2: output: universal perturbation vector 𝑣. 
3: Initialize 𝑣 ← 0. 
4: while ℱ < 𝛿 do 
5:     Shuffle training set 𝑋. 
6:     for ordinal images 𝑥𝑖 in 𝑋 do 
7:         if 𝐶(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑣) = 𝐶(𝑥𝑖) then 
8:             if 𝑣 = 0 then 
9:                 Compute perturbation ∆𝑣𝑖 that has the smallest magnitude 
and fools 𝐶(∙): 
10:                 ∆𝑣𝑖← arg min
           𝑣𝑖
‖𝑣𝑖‖2 s. t.  𝐶(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑣 + 𝑣𝑖) ≠ 𝐶(𝑥𝑖). 
11:             else then 
12:                 Compute perturbation ∆𝑣𝑖 that has similar orientation to 𝑣 
and fools 𝐶(∙): 
13:                 ∆𝑣𝑖← arg max
           𝑣𝑖
cos < 𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣 >  s. t.  𝐶(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑣 + 𝑣𝑖) ≠
𝐶(𝑥𝑖). 
14:             end if 
15:             Update the perturbation:  𝑣 ← 𝑣 + ∆𝑣𝑖. 
16:             Clip 𝑣 to maintain ℓ∞ norm restriction. 
17:         end if 
18:     end for 
19: end while 
 
FIGURE 6.  Time for generating universal perturbations to reach designated fooling rates by UAP and Fast-UAP. 
   
We pick 10000 random images as training samples from 
ILSVRC 2012 [28] training set, with 10 images for every class, 
and 50000 images from ILSVRC 2012 validation set as testing 
samples. To evaluate the performance of Fast-UAP and UAP 
on multiple CNN architectures, we choose seven popular 
CNN models such as DenseNet-121 [23], GoogLeNet [24], 
Vgg-16 [25], Vgg-19 [25], ResNet-50 [26], ResNet-101 [26], 
and ResNeXt-101 [27]. We generate universal perturbations 
for each of these CNN models via Algorithm 1. For ease of 
comparison, we also generate universal perturbations by UAP 
under the same experiment conditions. the size of input images 
and computed perturbations are 224×224 for ease of cross 
experiments. The visualization of universal perturbations 
generated by UAP and Fast-UAP for the aforementioned 
seven CNN models are shown in Fig. 4. The visual examples 
of perturbed images by adding universal perturbations 
generated by Fast-UAP are shown in Fig. 5. It can be seen that 
universal perturbations generated by Fast-UAP remain quasi-
imperceptible to the human eye. 
A. THE PERFORMANCE OF FAST-UAP 
To evaluate the performance of Fast-UAP, we now examine 
the time and images needed to generate universal 
perturbations to meet designated fooling rates by UAP and 
Fast-UAP respectively. We preset several fooling rates above 
50%, then record time of UAP and Fast-UAP to generate 
universal perturbations for the seven aforementioned CNN 
models to meet one of the fooling rates and number of the 
corresponding images. We stop algorithm when fooling rates 
do not rise up because universal perturbations generated for 
different CNN models may have different fooling rate upper 
bounds. We run the experiments for each CNN model on the 
same equipment with no other jobs running on the system. The 
experiment results are shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 respectively. 
It can be observed in Fig. 6 that Fast-UAP generates universal 
perturbations in a shorter time comparing with that of UAP on 
all tested CNN models. For example, for DenseNet-121 model, 
it takes UAP about 5100 seconds to generate a universal 
perturbation to meet the designated fooling rate of 60%, while 
it takes Fast-UAP about 1500 seconds to do so, which is an 
hour faster in time. It can also be seen from the diagrams in 
Fig. 7  that  universal  perturbations  generated  by  Fast-UAP 
  
  
FIGURE 7.  Number of images needed for generating universal perturbations to reach designated fooling rates by UAP and Fast-UAP. Uni-
versal perturbations generated by UAP for Vgg-16, Vgg-19, and ResNeXt-101 models cannot reach 80% fooling rate, so there is no comparison 
in the bottom right diagram for these models. 
   
  DenseNet-121 GoogLeNet Vgg-16 Vgg-19 ResNet-50 ResNet-101 ResNeXt-101 Mean 
Dense-
Net-121 
UAP  81.53% 58.25% 46.18% 43.79% 52.37% 52.06% 47.56% 54.53% 
Fast-UAP 90.67% 74.25% 54.52% 51.97% 70.06% 69.37% 58.49% 67.05% 
Increment 9.14% 16.00% 8.34% 8.18% 17.69% 17.31% 10.93% 12.51% 
Goog-
LeNet 
UAP 21.63% 87.04% 20.73% 20.88% 23.12% 22.32% 17.37% 30.44% 
Fast-UAP 29.58% 94.88% 27.67% 27.51% 31.95% 29.98% 22.18% 37.68% 
Increment 7.95% 7.84% 6.94% 6.63% 8.83% 7.66% 4.81% 7.24% 
Vgg-16 
UAP 57.82% 65.51% 77.31% 69.54% 55.54% 57.03% 47.26% 61.43% 
Fast-UAP 65.19% 76.78% 84.46% 77.67% 63.82% 66.04% 52.77% 69.53% 
Increment 7.37% 11.27% 7.15% 8.13% 8.28% 9.01% 5.51% 8.10% 
Vgg-19 
UAP 54.56% 63.94% 69.99% 76.12% 53.77% 52.30% 41.44% 58.87% 
Fast-UAP 59.52% 72.20% 76.24% 80.40% 61.41% 60.91% 48.01% 65.53% 
Increment 4.96% 8.26% 6.25% 4.28% 7.64% 8.61% 6.57% 6.65% 
ResNet-
50 
UAP 53.7% 59.41% 43.44% 42.97% 81.41% 63.15% 46.81% 55.84% 
Fast-UAP 65.93% 68.24% 48.82% 47.21% 89.58% 72.93% 52.90% 63.66% 
Increment 12.23% 8.83% 5.38% 4.24% 8.17% 9.78% 6.09% 7.82% 
ResNet-
101 
UAP 50.96% 56.49% 44.63% 43.48% 59.56% 83.83% 41.73% 54.38% 
Fast-UAP 62.35% 66.44% 49.52% 49.38% 71.28% 90.67% 52.61% 63.18% 
Increment 11.39% 9.95% 4.89% 5.90% 11.72% 6.84% 10.88% 8.80% 
Res-
NeXt-
101 
UAP 56.45% 44.71% 34.93% 34.39% 47.12% 50.93% 77.85% 49.48% 
Fast-UAP 64.45% 63.69% 48.91% 46.66% 62.38% 63.99% 80.91% 61.57% 
Increment 8.00% 18.98% 13.98% 12.27% 15.26% 13.06% 3.06% 12.09% 
always reach a designated fooling rate with smaller number of 
training images comparing with that of UAP. For example, for 
ResNet-50 model, UAP needs about 6500 images to generate 
a universal perturbation  to  meet the  designated  fooling  rate  
60% while Fast-UAP only needs about 2500 images to do so.  
B.  THE FOOLING RATE UNDER WHITE-BOX ATTACKS 
AND BLACK-BOX ATTACKS SCENARIOS 
In the last experiment, we empirically observed that universal 
perturbations generated by Fast-UAP always achieve higher 
fooling rates. To evaluate fooling performance of Fast-UAP 
more completely, we now examine the fooling rates of UAP 
and Fast-UAP under white-box attacks, where attacker can 
access to victim model, as well as under black-box attacks, 
where attacker have little knowledge about victim model. That 
is, for one instance of universal perturbation generated for a 
target model (e.g. DenseNet-121), we study its fooling rates 
on the same target model as well as other models (e.g. 
GoogLeNet) which are not used to generate it. We set 
designated fooling rate δ to be 100% to get the actual 
maximum fooling rates of universal perturbations and 
terminate algorithm when fooling rates does not rise up. The 
experiment results on testing samples (they are not used to 
generate the universal perturbations) for the aforementioned 
seven CNN models are shown in Table. I. All diagonal entries 
in bold in the table are fooling rates of white-box attacks while 
other entries except the right most column represent fooling 
rates of black-box attacks. It is empirically observed from the 
table that universal perturbations generated by Fast-UAP 
achieve an average fooling rate increment of 6.64% under 
white-box attacks. In particular, for DenseNet-121 model, the 
fooling rate increment is even higher than 9%. As for black-
box attacks, we can also find that fooling rates of universal 
perturbations generated by Fast-UAP is always higher than 
that of UAP. This experiment shows that Fast-UAP has better 
fooling performance in both white-box attacks and black-box 
attacks. 
V. CONCLUTION 
Though deep neural networks show state-of-the-art perfor-
mance in diverse tasks, the vulnerability of deep neural net-
works has been the hot topic in recent years. Specially, there 
is an iterative algorithm called UAP to generate one single per-
turbation to make a set of natural images to be misclassified 
on CNN models with high probability. In this paper, we illus-
trated the orientations of perturbation vectors have influence 
on magnitude growth of aggregation of these vectors, which 
may slow down the process to generate universal perturbations. 
Then we proposed Fast-UAP to overcome this influence. The 
experiments showed that Fast-UAP can generate universal 
perturbations much faster. Furthermore, we empirically ob-
served in experiments that the universal perturbations gener-
ated by Fast-UAP achieve higher fooling rates in both white-
box attacks and black-box attacks. A research to explore why 
TABLE I.  Fooling rates of universal perturbations generated by UAP vs. by Fast-UAP. The percentages indicate fooling rates. The rows indicate the 
target models for which universal perturbations are computed, the fooling rate increments of Fast-UAP compared with that of UAP are also listed. The 
columns indicate test models. The diagonal entries in bold represents fooling rates under white-box attacks and other entries (except rightmost column) 
represent fooling rates under black-box attacks. The rightmost column indicates averages of each row. 
   
aggregating perturbations with a similar orientation leads to an 
increment in the fooling rate will be the focus of our future 
work. 
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